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AUSTRALIA'S OPERATION SOVEREIGN BORDERS:  
DISCOURSE, POWER, AND POLICY FROM A CRIMMIGRATION 
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Patrick van Berlo* 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the role of discourse in Australia’s current border control policy, 
‘Operation Sovereign Borders’. From a crimmigration perspective, it examines how 
discourse contributes to the dichotomous understanding of crimmigration as combining ‘loud 
panicking’ and ‘quiet manoeuvring’. A Critical Discourse Analysis is applied, thereby 
examining not only the discourse at a textual level, but also how the discursive setting and the 
socio-political context influence the effects of discourse. The results show that Operation 
Sovereign Borders focuses on border protection and securitization through a ‘strong and 
consistent’ deterrence policy. It creates ‘loud panic’ vis-à-vis crimmigrant others and draws 
border securitization into the field of administrative immigration control. Immigrants are 
distinguished on the basis of their mode of transportation, creating an image of a 
homogeneous crimmigrant group of illegal and non-deserving boat migrants buying places 
from human traffickers. Through offshore processing and a dominant discourse, the 
Australian Government is simultaneously able to ‘quietly manoeuvre’, thereby leaving little 
room for alternative discourses or critiques. Discourse thus plays a pivotal role in creating 
‘loud panic’ and in enabling ‘quiet manoeuvring’, which are much more interwoven and 
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mutually reinforcing than sometimes suggested. This fosters the Government’s ability to 
effectively implement restrictive immigration measures. 
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1. Introduction 
In September 2013, the Australian Government implemented a revised border control policy, 
‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ (hereinafter: ‘OSB’). It is the successor of the Pacific 
Solution, which entered into force in 2001 and entailed that irregular migrants travelling to 
Australia by boat were intercepted and transferred to offshore facilities in Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea (hereinafter: ‘PNG’) for asylum claims to be processed.1 These centres were 
governed by nodal structures involving multiple countries and various private contractors.
2
 
Asylum processing on the territory of Nauru and PNG continued up until 2007, when Kevin 
Rudd, Australia’s newly elected Labor Prime Minister, decided to end the existing offshore 
arrangements.
3
 This abandoning, however, proved to be temporarily as offshore centres were 
reopened in 2012 by the then Labor Government on the basis of advice provided by an Expert 
Panel on Asylum Seekers.
4
 Upon taking office in September 2013, the Abbott administration 
emphasized that it would continue offshore processing in so-called Regional Processing 
Centres (hereinafter: ‘RPCs’) in Nauru and PNG, and announced reforms to the existing 
arrangements, turning the Pacific Solution into the military-led Operation Sovereign Borders.
5
 
                                                          
1
 K.F. Afeef, The Politics of Extraterritorial Processing: Offshore Asylum Policies in Europe and the Pacific, 
Refugees Studies Centre Working Paper No. 36, 2006, available at:  
http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/wp36-politics-extraterritorial-processing-
2006.pdf (last visited 23 Apr 2015); A. Babacan & H. Babacan, "Detention Downunder: New Directions in the 
Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia", Uluslararasi Hukuk ve Politika, 4, 2008, 137-148; T. Magner, "A 
Less than ‘Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia", International Journal of Refugee Law, 16, 2004, 
53-90; P. Mathew, "Australian Refugee Protection in the wake of Tampa",  American Journal of International 
Law, 96, 2002, 661-676; P.K. Rajaram, "“Making Place”: The “Pacific Solution” and Australian Emplacement in 
the Pacific and on Refugee Bodies", Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 24, 2003, 290-306. 
2
 In relation to nodal structures of detention, see P. Van Berlo, "The Crimmigrant as Captive and Commodity: 
The Rise of Privatised and Offshore Detention from a Crimmigration Perspective", JASON Magazine, Jubilee 
issue, 2015 (forthcoming).  
3
 C. Skehan, "Asylum, immigration Major Factors in Australian Elections", The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Dec 
2007, available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/pacific-solution-ends-but-tough-stance-to-
remain/2007/12/07/1196813021259.html (last visited 23 Apr 2015). 
4
 See in particular recommendations 8 and 9 at page 16 of the report. A. Houston, P. Aristotle & M. L’Estrange, 
Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, August 2012, available at: 
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/files/2015/03/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_f
ull_report.pdf (last visited 21 Sept 2015).  
5
 Liberal Party of Australia, The Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders Policy, 2013, available at:  
http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2013/07/26/operation-sovereign-borders  (last visited 23 Apr 2015); M. 
A campaign with the slogan “No way, they will not make Australia home” was subsequently 
launched, focusing on the main countries of origin of irregular migrants.
6
 Key to the policy 
framework is that it maintains that no irregular migrant arriving by boat will be resettled in 
Australia: rather, those granted refugee protection will be resettled in third countries.
7
  
Whilst Australia provides an exemplary context, offshore immigration control and 
detention also occurs – and has occurred – elsewhere.8 The USA, for instance, already 
implemented offshore detention in 1981 when it detained Haitian asylum-seekers at 
Guantánamo Bay in Cuba.
9
 In Europe, offshore immigration detention measures have been 
proposed, although most have either not materialized or concern a more broad-ranging 
approach covering various issues including regional protection and development assistance.
10
 
In the case of Italy, asylum detention camps have been set up in Libya and significant 
numbers of asylum-seekers are detained in overcrowded detention centres on the remote 
island of Lampedusa.
11
 Still, these instances differ significantly from the Australian situation 
where mandatory detention in case of irregular maritime arrivals is all-encompassing and 
relocated in full to the territory of another sovereign State. Indeed, detention centres in Libya 
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were to a large extent ad hoc and detention on Lampedusa constitutes no de jure 
extraterritorialization as it occurs within Italian sovereign territory.
12
 As such, "the draconian 
and unilateral predictions of European extraterritorial processing did not materialise".
13
 In 
light of present day migration developments in the Mediterranean Sea, however, the topic 
remains highly debated and surfaces in the European political realm every time another tragic 
loss of life occurs.
14
 
Either explicitly or in a more implicit manner, Australia’s Pacific Solution has 
frequently been discussed within the ‘crimmigration’ literature.15 The concept of 
‘crimmigration’ denotes an increasing merger of features that were traditionally and 
doctrinally squared within the separate domains of criminal justice and migration control.
16
 
Amongst others, the merger – which can be seen as a response to growing insecurities related 
to processes of globalization – enables ‘outsiders’ to be distinguished from ‘insiders’.17 As 
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various authors have outlined, the Pacific Solution can be squared as such a crimmigration 
mechanism.
18
 It is hardly surprising that OSB as its successor likewise amounts to a 
framework of crimmigration: it has become military-led and has further standardized that 
unauthorized arrivals are fully barred from resettlement and residence in Australia.
19
 As 
Grewcock argues, Australia’s border policing regime "was ratcheted up" significantly by 
OSB, making the existing arrangements "more draconian".
20
 Similarly, Hodge speaks about a 
"transfer of illegitimacy" and a "criminalisation of asylum seeker bodies", thereby firmly 
drawing the policy in the crimmigration debate.
21
 The fact that border control has become a 
military affair cannot be underestimated in this regard either: as Graham has stipulated, we are 
witnessing a “proliferation of hard, militarized borders” between countries all over the world, 
which is “geared towards trying to separate people and circulations deemed risky or malign 
from those deemed risk-free or worthy of protection”.22 
Focusing on the Pacific Solution, Welch has outlined that crimmigration can be 
understood as a dichotomous process.
23
 As such, he argues that the Australian Government 
utilizes both ‘walls of noise’ (or ‘loud panicking’) and ‘walls of governance’ (or ‘quiet 
manoeuvring’) in the process of crimmigration. On the one hand, political discourse would be 
used to create a "loud panic" about irregular migrant arrivals, providing a basis for 
Governments to introduce restrictive legislative and policy frameworks to counter-act 
irregular arrivals.
24
 As such, it has been argued that "discursive practice has served to 
construct a mythic image of a deviant and criminal asylum seeking population that has 
enabled the justification of increasingly restrictive and draconian legislation and policy".
25
 On 
the other hand, Governments utilize "quiet manoeuvring" tactics – including media 
stonewalling, privatization and, of particular interest for this article, offshore detention – as 
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governance walls "behind which the state quietly manoeuvres on matters of crimmigration".
26
 
Due to the combination of both types of walls, crimmigration developments in law and policy 
would remain simultaneously justified and little exposed.
27
 
The present article will explore the aptness of such a framework by applying it to 
political discourse concerning OSB. In particular, it attempts to answer a two-folded question: 
on the one hand, it asks to what extent the political discourse indeed creates 'loud panic' about 
irregular migrant arrivals as a 'wall of noise' to justify restrictive policy. On the other hand, it 
asks to what extent such discourse has an impact on the construction of 'quiet manoeuvring' as 
a 'wall of governance'.  
A Critical Discourse Analysis will likewise be applied in a two-folded fashion. First, 
the existence and extent of ‘loud panicking’ will be examined through the assessment of two 
discursive themes: (i) what the goals of offshore processing under OSB are, and (ii) which 
migrants it targets. These themes may reveal on which basis the policy framework is justified. 
Secondly, the impact of the political discourse on tactics of ‘quiet manoeuvring’ will be 
examined through the analysis of a third discursive theme, i.e. (iii) how responsibilities are 
divided and/or diffused on a discursive level between the Governments involved. As such, 
whilst it departs from Welch’ dichotomous framework of analysis, it adds more specific 
indicators to outline whether ‘loud panicking’ and ‘quiet manoeuvring’ can indeed be 
distinguished. In this way, the question whether such processes occur does not require an 
‘either-or’ answer but can be tailored in relation to specific themes. In addition, by using such 
themes, it becomes possible to dissect the construction of both walls, thereby outlining their 
nuances and potential internal ambivalences. Simultaneously, it allows future research to add 
or modify themes to accommodate for the peculiarities of specific contexts and situations.  
 
2. Crimmigration and discourse 
Over time, the relationship between criminal law and immigration law (and between crime 
control and immigration control) has become increasingly close-knit in what has been labelled 
as a process of "crimmigration".
28
 Whilst the two regimes are underpinned by distinct legal 
frameworks, they share a synthesized gatekeeping function which is increasingly effectuated 
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through the application of membership theory and the distinguishing of ‘outsiders’ from 
‘insiders’.29 This development has often been argued to be closely related to the securitization 
and protection of the nation State (or the ‘insiders’) against threats originating increasingly on 
a global scale.
30
 As outlined by Van der Woude and Van Berlo, the process of crimmigration  
 
… manifests itself on different levels: the level of political and public discourse, where 
crime and immigration are increasingly lumped together in debates and political 
decision making, the legislative level, where substantive criminal law and immigration 
law are increasingly merged – and the level of procedure and enforcement.31  
 
Focusing on the level of political discourse, it appears that immigration debates are 
increasingly shaped by "discourses of criminalization", resulting in crimmigration forms of 
policy making, media attention and public discussions.
32
 This discourse is often framed within 
broader discussions on border protection and securitization.
33
 From that perspective, certain 
groups of immigrants are increasingly scapegoated and framed as "bogus", "dangerous 
others", "illegal migrants" and/or "enemies of the state" who threaten national borders.
34
 As 
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Hyndman and Mountz put it, "[i]n the conﬂation of public discourse about terrorists, refugees, 
economic migrants, human smuggling and others on the move, people are stripped of their 
identities as individuals and re-subjectiﬁed as groups".35 Such framing occurs not only in 
political discourse, but also in jurisprudence
36
 and in media reporting.
37
 These media 
representations in turn provide a "communicative bridge" between political actors and the 
public, thereby having the potential of shaping the latter’s views.38  
Importantly, however, not all immigrants are excluded through crimmigration 
discourse: rather, a distinction is made between "bona fide" travellers (such as cosmopolitan 
jetsetters) and "crimmigrant others" (such as certain groups of asylum-seekers or economic 
migrants), with the former being included and the latter being excluded through different 
levels of border permeability and novel discursive categories of ‘belonging’ citizenry.39 As 
such, crimmigration has what may be called a differentiating capacity, distinguishing 
individuals not on their alienness but on their type of alienness. In turn, various mechanisms 
have been identified which are used to effectively exclude those identified as ‘crimmigrant 
others’ with little public exposure or accountability.40 
 
3. Methodology 
In line with Lupton, discourse analysis in this article is meant to purport to a contextualized 
analysis of language and the reproduction of ideologies and belief systems in discourse.
41
 The 
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starting point is that language is not a neutral reflection of the world, nor of social relations or 
personal identities, but rather plays an active role in creating, maintaining and altering them.
42
 
A qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis (hereinafter: ‘CDA’) as grounded in the 
work of Fairclough will be conducted.
43
 It is often used to examine inequality and power 
struggles in discursive practices and is thus highly valuable to examine the relation between 
language, ideology and power in political speech and discourse.
44
 CDA holds that political 
activities embody struggles for power to put political, social and economic ideas and ideals 
into practice. Language is crucial, since "every political action is prepared, accompanied, 
influenced and played by language".
45
 Discourse analysis, in turn, attempts to unravel the way 
in which texts are utilized to express certain ideological perspectives "delicately and 
covertly".
46
 In this regard, it should be emphasized from the outset that this methodology is to 
a certain extent inherently normative: it is based on the presumption that language and 
discourse are potential tools of power and empowerment and can be utilized to foster certain 
ideas and ideals. Discourse is thus not perceived as a neutral and value-free concept, but 
rather as an ideologically-loaded phenomenon. This is not to say that the CDA approach by 
definition provides a normative perspective on certain uses of discourse. On the contrary, 
CDA is applied to denote the normative aspects of discourse, not to provide a normative 
judgment of such discourse per se.   
To perform a CDA, Fairclough has developed a three-dimensional analytical model 
comprising the following steps: (i) an examination of a text’s linguistic features (that is the 
"level of the text", or micro level), (ii) the exploration of processes related to the text's 
production and consumption (that is the "level of the discursive practice", or meso level), and 
(iii) the consideration of the text’s wider cultural and social context, of which the text is a 
"communicative event" (that is the "level of the sociocultural practice", or macro level).
47
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Hence, discourse is wider than ‘text’ and comprises whole processes of social interaction.48 
These processes are bi-directional: that is to say, the way language is used is not only shaped 
and influenced by the socio-cultural framework in which it is positioned, but this socio-
cultural framework is simultaneously shaped and influenced by the way language is used.
49
 
Text and context thus continuously model each other.  
The analysis will focus on the three aforementioned themes: (i) the goals of offshore 
processing, (ii) the targeted migrants, and (iii) regional cooperation and (the diffusion of) 
responsibilities. By looking for documents comprising political discourse in relation to OSB 
on the websites
50
 of the Liberal Party of Australia, as well as the websites of the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service, the following publicly available documents have been identified for the envisaged 
analysis: (i) the Coalition’s pre-election OSB policy brief as published in July 2013, 
consisting of 20 pages,
51
 and (ii) all 16 transcripts of the press conferences concerning OSB as 
published on the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service website up until January 
2015, consisting of 481 pages and comprising 100,536 words.
52
 The first transcript dates back 
to the 24
th
 of September 2013, whilst the last transcript was dated the 17
th
 of January 2014. 
During the remainder of 2014, no press conferences have occurred.  
 
4. Operation Sovereign Borders: a critical discourse analysis 
In July 2013, the Liberal Party and the Nationals Party (together ‘the Coalition’) published a 
policy brief outlining their envisaged OSB policy.
53
 Since the inauguration of the Coalition 
Government in September 2013 and the implementation of OSB, the Australian Minister for 
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Immigration and Border Protection at the time, Scott Morrison,
54
 gave weekly press 
conferences in relation to OSB together with the Commander of OSB, Lieutenant General 
Angus Campbell, or, in case of his absence, the Acting Commander of OSB, Air Chief 
Marshall Mark Binskin. On the 25
th
 of October 2013, Assistant Commissioner Steve 
Lancester of the Australian Federal Police was present as well. The press conferences were 
held on a weekly basis until the beginning of January 2014.  
 
4.1. Textual analysis at the micro level 
4.1.1. Goals of offshore processing 
The examined documents outline multiple goals of offshore processing under OSB. From the 
outset, it should be noted that the goals of offshore processing and the goals of the wider 
policy framework should be seen in a continuum, in particular given the fact that offshore 
processing is a core feature of OSB and is geared towards its successive achievement. As 
such, five main goals can be discerned in the discourse: deterrence (and repatriation of 
previous boat arrivals), the protection of Australia’s borders and national sovereignty, saving 
lives at sea, preventing irregular boat arrivals from queue-jumping, and – to a lesser extent – 
spending available budgets better and more efficiently.  
One of the main underlying rationales provided is that of deterrence: thus, the offshore 
processing of asylum-seekers is predicated on the deterrence of boat migration and human 
trafficking, in line with the so-called ‘Regional Deterrence Framework’ that the Coalition has 
developed. Amongst others, this becomes clear from the facts that the policy structure is 
outlined to be focused "single-mindedly"
55
 on deterrence, and that deterrence has been 
advocated by the Coalition "for years",
56
 implying that it is one of the main goals sought by 
the Coalition administration. Indeed, the catchphrase "stopping the boats"
57
 has almost 
become synonymous for the Operation in its entirety, with the discourse being very much 
focused on a "tougher" and "absolute" approach
58
 towards "illegal boats" and human 
trafficking. By using terms such as "commitment", "promised",
59
 "determined",
60
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"objective",
61
 "focus",
62
 "high standard",
63
 "full commitment"
64
 and "full steam ahead",
65
 the 
absolute disruption of smuggling flows is outlined to be both a key promise to the Australian 
voters and a main objective of the Government. Whilst it is outlined that the deterrence goal is 
"demanding", the Joint Agency Taskforce "would rather set a high standard and strive toward 
it than to settle for some accommodation with criminals".
66
 In addition, offshore processing is 
discoursed to be intended to make detained migrants return to their home regions: indeed, 
repatriation is outlined to be a "critical component"
67
 of offshore processing. 
Closely connected to this deterrence approach is the goal of protecting Australia’s 
borders and national sovereignty, amongst others against transnational crime.
68
 Securitization 
discourse thus frequently recurs, amongst others through statements that "our policies have 
always been about protecting Australia’s sovereignty"69 and that they are aimed at "border 
security"
70
 and restoring "faith in our immigration system".
71
 Australia’s national borders are 
thus discoursed to be essential features of Australia’s sovereignty and as being under threat, 
warranting the implementation of OSB – in particular given that "[t]he Coalition has a clear 
and consistent policy commitment to border protection".
72
 
Simultaneously, "saving lives at sea" recurs as a policy goal. By outlining the impact 
and significance of "the tragedies at sea",
73
 as well as by stating that boats are "the most 
dangerous place[s] to be",
74
 it is maintained that the policy is beneficial also for boat migrants 
themselves.
75
 Additionally, the aim of providing protection for "genuine" asylum-seekers is 
outlined. Thus, refugees in offshore UNHCR centres would be disadvantaged if a significant 
share of boat migrants would be resettled as refugees in Australia, because the latter would be 
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"jumping the queue".
76
 This humanitarian-inspired aim aligns with the fact that Australia 
accepts a significant annual inflow of refugees from offshore UNCHR detention centres in 
conflict regions, which according to the discourse can only be maintained by a strict approach 
towards irregular boat influxes.
77
 
Moreover, budgetary motivations seem to play a role, albeit a modest one given the 
incidental discursive attention paid to them – in particular during the press conferences. 
However, the discourse does not so much focus on lower budgetary spending by the current 
Coalition Government, but rather on alleged "cost blowouts" by the previous Labor 
Government. Thus, the Government is not so much claiming that it is spending less, but rather 
that the previous Government was not effective in its spending: both Labor’s expenditure and 
approach are labelled as weak and a "failure".
78
 This discourse is tied up with a connotation of 
bureaucracy, inadequacy and disengagement: by using terms such as "too much is falling 
between the cracks",
79
 it is implied that Labor’s policies are simply not effective enough. 
Labor is even deemed to be the overseer of the weakest border protection policies, failing on 
borders "like no other government in Australia's history".
80
 This alleged disengagement is 
discursively strengthened by outlining the "Captain Emad" incident concerning an alleged 
human trafficker who fled Australia whilst the Labor Government was in office.
81
 Labor’s 
policy framework is consequently mirrored with the Coalition’s proposed approach. Indeed, 
by exemplifying that a Coalition Government will "hit the ground running"
82
 with key 
initiatives "to be undertaken in the first 100 days"
83
 and will ultimately "get this job done",
84
 
and by using positive catchwords such as "focus",
85
 "energy",
86
 "strong",
87
 "consistent"
88
 and 
"successfully",
89
 a determined and efficient approach with strong and effective leadership is 
envisaged.  
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4.1.2. Targeted migrants 
The discourse almost exclusively focuses on migrants who embark for Australia by boat: it 
continuously uses phrases such as "the boats still keep coming",
90
 "stopping the boats",
91
 
"illegal arrivals by boat",
92
 "managing illegal boat arrivals"
93
 and "turn back boats".
94
 By 
comparison, the mode of transportation that most irregular migrants use when travelling to 
Australia, namely by airplane,
95
 is not focused upon: indeed, words such as "air", "plane", 
"airplane" and "aircraft" hardly occur in the discourse. 
 In relation to boat migrants, the discourse maintains various framings. First of all, 
boat migrants are framed as smuggled persons. Indeed, the discourse often refers to the 
involvement of human traffickers in boat migration, which is substantiated by individualized 
examples in the discourse.
96
 During some press conferences, photo images, nationalities and 
ages of respective smuggling suspects were provided.
97
 Boat migrants are discoursed to be 
customers or rational passengers knowingly buying services of such tactical human 
traffickers. Thus, boat migrants are referred to as calculating persons and "prospective 
passengers"
98
 with "money in their pocket",
99
 who buy products from traffickers and who can 
effectively be deterred by raising the stakes. For instance, the discourse metaphorically states 
that the Australian Government has to take "the sugar off the table".
100
  
In addition,  closely related to the policy’s goal of protecting Australia’s sovereignty, 
boat migrants are outlined as illegals, threatening national sovereign borders and creating an 
emergency situation. This happens implicitly through a language of illegality. For example, it 
is stated that "anyone seeking to illegally enter Australia […], who come illegally by boat, 
will not be resettled in Australia."
101
 Moreover, it is outlined that the operations are carried 
out so as to "provide active deterrents to those seeking to enter Australia illegally by boat. 
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Such operations are undertaken to protect the sovereignty of Australia's borders".
102
 It 
happens, however, also more explicitly by linking boat migrants to particular crime types: 
boat migration is for example linked to piracy,
103
 emphasising an image of deviant 
immigrants compromising Australia’s borders.104 Moreover, the discourse states that "the 
largest number of charges for sexual assault […] have actually related to asylum seekers who 
had arrived illegally by boat".
105
 It is furthermore stated that migrants – who are in Australia 
"at the courtesy of the Australian government and the Australian people"
106
 – will be held 
accountable to higher standards for criminal behaviour as a result of "low tolerance".
107
  
Boat migrants are moreover depicted as increasingly coming to Australia in mass 
numbers, emphasising both the threat they allegedly pose to national borders and the impact 
they have on the Government’s budgetary burden. Thus, "[t]he total cost to Australian 
taxpayers for managing illegal boat arrivals has increased from $85 million in 2007-08 to $3 
billion in 2013-14".
108
 It is emphasized that the immigration control budget could also have 
been spent on "Australian schools, hospitals or improving our infrastructure".
109
 
Throughout the discourse, boat migrants are contrasted against two groups of people: 
Australian citizens on the one hand and ‘genuine’ refugees, i.e. refugees who apply via 
offshore UNHCR refugee resettlement centres, on the other.
110
 In relation to Australians, the 
discourse clearly outlines that (1) Australian citizens are distinct from boat migrants, (2) 
Australian servicemen and servicewomen in the Navy put themselves at risk to implement this 
policy, and (3) Australian voters have instructed the Government to implement the current 
policies by electing them. In speaking about Australian servicemen and servicewomen, the 
discourse uses  statements such as that "[t]hey respond with a professionalism, a selflessness 
and a sense of urgency that all Australians should be proud of and which I am proud. Any 
suggestion otherwise is as offensive as it is wrong".
111
  
In relation to "genuine" refugees, boat migrants are discoursed as queue-jumping and 
taking places of refugees who otherwise would be resettled as part of Australia’s "generous 
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humanitarian intake".
112
 By using terms as "desperate people"
113
 and "genuine refugees",
114
 a 
distinction is made between those situated in humanitarian programmes abroad and those 
"buy[ing] a place".
115
 It remains unclear from the discourse how this dichotomous approach 
should be seen in light of other statements that a significant share of boat migrants turns out to 
be genuine refugees. One possible interpretation of the discourse is that boat migrants are 
non-deserving rather than non-genuine due to their arrival by boat. Another potential 
interpretation is that boat migrants are generally non-genuine in their claims, notwithstanding 
the fact that they may qualify as refugees under the Refugee Convention. Both accounts seem 
to be problematic from a legal point of view: the former would hold that the mode of 
transportation can influence the degree to which one deserves protection, whilst the latter 
implies that the definition of ‘refugee’ under Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is too 
broadly applied.
116
  
Within the category of boat migrants, no further distinction is envisaged. The 
discourse expressly outlines that neither the rightfulness of the asylum claim, nor the 
nationality, age, gender, profession, or any other character trait of the migrant, has an 
influence on the application of offshore processing. Indeed, "our policies are designated to 
stop people getting on boats. Children, families, single adult males, unaccompanied minors, 
all of them".
117
  In a similar vein, it is stated that "[t]here will be no exceptions, whether 
you're Syrian, Iranian, single, married, adult, child, they will all be going to Nauru or Manus 
Island and will not return to live in Australia".
118
 
Boat migrants are simultaneously discoursed as vulnerable victims of human 
trafficking. As such, two distinct narratives are utilized: on the one hand, boat migrants are 
discoursed to be victims of a "sordid business".
119
 By outlining the number of people that 
have perished at sea,
120
 the discourse emphasizes the impact and significance of the issue 
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concerned. On the other hand, by using phrases such as "want",
121
 "reconsider",
122
 and "put 
themselves […] at great risk",123 boat migrants are depicted as voluntarily and willingly 
endangering themselves and their family members – including their children – by cooperating 
with human traffickers and by saying "all sorts of things"
124
 to get into the country.  
 
4.1.3. Regional cooperation and (the diffusion of) responsibilities 
According to the policy brief, OSB is based on regional cooperation involving multiple 
sovereign States, with regionalism being a "key element"
125
 and "at the heart"
126
 of the 
framework. Simultaneously, it is emphasized that strong and decisive action on behalf of the 
Australian Government is required. The policy brief indeed outlines that "the Coalition has 
always considered that regional cooperation is not a substitute for taking strong action 
ourselves"
127
 and that "working with other countries is necessarily complementary".
128
  
Australia is positioned as having the responsibility to "engage and support" partner 
States through "strong" and "decisive" action.
129
 As such, the Australian Government is 
"supporting" and "encouraging"
130
 partner States in relation to their on-water operations, law 
enforcement, legal system, border control mechanisms and safety monitoring. The discourse 
points out the intention to "commence increasing capacity at offshore processing centres",
131
 
thereby indicating that the Australian Government has a significant influence on offshore 
capacity issues. No further reference to the Governments of Nauru and PNG occurs when 
such capacity issues are discussed. 
In relation to responsibility issues, the policy brief outlines relatively extensively the 
Australian domestic hierarchical structures. It sets out that the Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection will be responsible and will have "all the necessary resources of 
government at his or her command".
132
 Furthermore, it states that a Joint Agency Taskforce 
will be set up with various operational task groups. The policy brief contains a schematic 
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depiction of the chain of command, with the hierarchy and positions of all relevant agencies 
being outlined.
133
  
On the level of bilateral structures, however, it remains unclear on whom 
responsibility vis-à-vis the RPCs rests. The discourse uses phrases such as "joint committee" 
and "partnership", envisaging various actors to be responsible to some extent for certain 
aspects of offshore processing. On the one hand, Nauru and PNG are discoursed to be 
sovereign partner nations that play a key role in the establishment and successful maintenance 
of offshore processing centres and who "run" the processing arrangements.
134
 On the other 
hand, the Australian Government provides "a significant amount of support"
135
 and exercises 
authorities that are gradually "transferred"
136
 to the Nauruan authorities, whilst local refugee 
status claim assessors are being trained by Australian professionals to build capacity. 
Moreover, investigations in the RPCs – including investigations of potential assaults – are 
seen as matters that rest with both the local authorities and with service providers who have 
been contracted by Australia but who operate under the national laws of the host countries. 
Additionally, there is a joint management committee dealing with the operations of the 
facilities. 
Nevertheless, according to various discursive lines of reasoning, the RPCs are in 
essence predominantly Australian. This is an important discursive trend to be discerned, not 
only because it puts statements that Nauru and PNG are ultimately the ones in charge into 
perspective but also because it is relevant for questions of accountability. Thus, the Australian 
Government is discursively centralized when it comes to managing various aspects of the 
offshore processing centres, as becomes clear from the following discursive strands.  
First, in relation to health and welfare conditions, the discourse outlines that it is the 
Australian Government that is providing the necessary services, including through contracting 
service providers. Thus, for example in relation to unaccompanied minors, it is stated that "we 
have contracting arrangements with those who directly provide services to unaccompanied 
minors".
137
 Likewise, in relation to pregnant women, it is stated that "[t]he Department […] 
has appropriate time and care for pregnant women if available, and is available on Nauru, as 
required".
138
 Commenting on a case of a pregnant migrant woman who was, due to health 
complications, transferred from Nauru to Australia to give birth, the Minister of Immigration 
                                                          
133
 Operation Sovereign Borders 2013 policy brief, page 15 
134
 Scott Morrison, 11 Oct 2013. 
135
 Scott Morrison, 01 Nov 2013. 
136
 Scott Morrison, 08 Nov 2013. 
137
 Scott Morrison, 22 Nov 2013. 
138
 Scott Morrison, 18 Oct 2013. 
and Border Protection outlines that "this woman's health was paramount in the minds of those 
who were providing her care, both the doctors and those working on behalf of the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection".
139
  
Second, the Australian Government is discoursed as safeguarding the dignity and 
respect of detained migrants. Indeed, the Minister refers to continuous reviews of the 
situations in offshore detention centres "to ensure that people are treated with dignity and 
respect"
140
. The Minister states that these steps are taken not only at Nauru and Manus Island, 
but also at Christmas Island, Blaydin Point, Villawood and Yongah Hill, which are all 
detention centres on Australian territory.
141
 In the discourse, the detention facilities at Nauru 
and Manus Island are discussed as falling within the same category as these facilities on 
domestic soil.  
Third, in a similar vein, the Minister outlines that Australia carries responsibility in 
relation to the safety of RPCs: indeed, the Australian Government is "taking every step we 
think is necessary to ensure the security of those facilities",
142
 which happens through service 
providers contracted by Australia but operating under the national laws of Nauru, respectively 
PNG. Responding to the Cornell report in which the February 2014 riots at the RPC on 
Manus Island (PNG) are reviewed,
143
 Minister Scott Morrison maintains that "that report is 
based on an incident that took place some months ago and we've been taken necessary steps to 
ensure proper security arrangements within that facility, as well as Nauru, and that's why 
we're able to expand the capacity and expand its operations and the centre I think has been 
operating very functionally and serving the purpose for which it's been tasked."
144
 
Fourth, the discourse continuously refers to "us" and "we" when operational matters, 
funding constructions, tendering private contractors, planning and practical arrangements are 
discussed. Indeed, phrases such as "we're achieving it",
145
 "we have been doing an enormous 
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amount of work",
146
 and "we've made enormous amount of progress"
147
 reoccur in the 
discourse. Thus, Australia "mak[es] things work on the ground"
148
 and reviews potential 
incidents, whilst Nauru and PNG are said to have done everything "they had been asked to 
do".
149
 Of particular interest in this regard is the so-called "three island, one system 
approach",
150
 which concerns a single approach for Manus Island (PNG), Nauru and 
Christmas Island. However, whilst Manus Island is sovereign territory of PNG and Nauru is a 
sovereign country, Christmas Island is – albeit territorially excised for migration purposes – 
sovereign territory of Australia. Thus, although different sovereigns are involved in the 
processing arrangements, a single system applies on all three islands.  
Fifth, Australia can independently decide to bring detainees from Nauru to Australia’s 
mainland, and can even have them arrested by the Australian Federal Police whilst residing in 
RPCs in Nauru and PNG. According to Angus Campbell, this has happened a 120 times 
within a couple of weeks.
151
 
Sixth, the discourse states that media access to the RPCs could harm the mental health 
of the detained persons as they may be provided with "unrealistic expectations about their 
outcomes".
152
 As Minister Scott Morrison puts it, "I have seen the impact on people's mental 
health of people who are given unrealistic expectations about their outcome. Sometimes that 
can flow from media exposure, and it can flow, frankly, from people who go and visit them 
and tell them something which is not going to happen. And that is a very cruel thing to do to 
people. And I won't be allowing that to happen."
153
 Such access is therefore restricted as a 
matter of policy by the Australian Government: indeed, "I think I indicated that to date I have 
seen nothing that would suggest that that policy [of media access] being changed would be in 
the interests of those who are in those centres".
154
 
 
4.2. Discursive practice analysis 
4.2.1. Policy brief 
The 2013 policy brief was issued and distributed in the run-up to the federal elections and was 
a tool for the Coalition to campaign its stance on boat migration. The discourse is one-
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directional and draws mainly on an electoral campaiging narrative.
155
 With 20 pages, the 
briefing paper is rather concise. It starts with a page of "key points" in which both the need for 
strong border policies and the failure of Labor are underlined. The subsequent sections deal 
with (i) Labor’s failure, (ii) the Coalition’s commitment, (iii) the importance of regional co-
operation, (iv) a comprehensive regional deterrence framework and (v) the way forward. 
Subsequently, the specific structures of OSB are outlined. The policy brief has four 
attachments, containing figures and graphs outlining the number of "illegal boat arrives since 
2007",
156
 the "number of persons arriving illegally by boat",
157
  the "annual spending on 
illegal boat arrivals"
158
 and "Australia’s detention population".159 It is not made clear where 
these data originate from or which definitional standards are used. 
The use of the electoral campaigning narrative may come as no surprise given that the 
discourse is conveyed by means of a pre-election document distributed to the electorate. Yet, 
it is useful to emphasise that the discourse should be understood in this context through which 
it is distributed, consumed, and ultimately gains meaning. Being prepared as an electoral tool 
by the Coalition parties, and being subsequently consumed by the public in the process of 
determining for which party to vote, the discourse used – including the outline of goals, 
targeted migrants, and regional (diffusion of) responsibilities – is discursively construed in a 
particular way. The ‘discursive event’ has as such a specific electoral interest in using 
resonating inclusionary and exclusionary language and is a powerful one-directional tool by 
which the Coalition can effectively convey a certain discourse to the public, especially since it 
has the power to guide the reader to a preferred reading.
160
 In the socio-cultural contextual 
analysis below, it will be further outlined in which direction resonance is sought in the policy 
brief.  
   
4.2.2. Press conference transcripts 
The press conferences are structured more or less in a similar vein each week, starting with 
statements from the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, followed by statements 
of the (Acting) Commander of the Joint Action Taskforce, which are subsequently followed 
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by a Q&A session. In the first few press conferences, both the Minister and the (Acting) 
Commander would remain at the disposal of the journalists throughout the entire session, but 
in later press conferences, this modality was changed: first, all questions concerning the 
weekly statistical updates could be posed to and answered by the (Acting) Commander, who 
would subsequently leave, after which more politically-sided questions could be posed to the 
Minister. The press conferences thus draw on two discursive strands, namely a military and a 
political discursivity. However, the interdiscursivity is limited as both are treated distinctly, 
being outlined and responded to by different authorities at separate stages of the discursive 
event.  
Different from the policy brief, the press conferences are thus framed within a 
military
161
 and political-journalistic discursivity rather than an electoral campaigning one, 
changing the dynamic of both the content and the interaction. On the one hand, the content is 
less focused on a comparison with previous Labor Government policy and is more aimed at 
actual progress and evolving issues, although references to Labor policies are occasionally 
made. On the other hand, the press conferences are not one-directional and provide an 
opportunity for interaction and dialogue as opposed to the policy brief’s electoral monologue.  
 However, during the press conferences, journalists notably became dissatisfied by the 
lack of genuine interaction and discussion. Indeed, they repeatedly alleged that the Minister 
and (Acting) Commander were warding off critical questions by stating that they cannot 
comment on ongoing tactical or operational matters and that they do not want to provide 
"shipping news" to human traffickers.
162
 In addition, in January 2014, the weekly press 
conferences were abolished and were replaced by press conferences on an "as-needs basis" in 
combination with weekly written statements and statistical releases.
163
 In effect, this means 
that press conferences will only be held if the Minister or the (Acting) Commander have "got 
something to say".
164
 For the rest of 2014, the discursive setting has almost ceased to exist as 
the Minister and (Acting) Commander have not conveyed any further press conference. 
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Instead, one-directional monthly operational updates are distributed. As such, the discursive 
practice has turned from potentially interactional to non-interactional. 
Again, it is of importance to realize that the discourse is framed from a particular 
understanding, originates from a certain power structure and is conveyed via a selected 
platform, in this case press conferences. The fact that limited interdiscursivity is provided for, 
and that alternative narratives are to a significant extent excluded through the choice of 
discursive practices, informs the goals, targeted migrants and division and/or diffusion of 
responsibilities by emphasising certain facts and priorities whilst leaving others unremarked 
or underexposed.  
 
4.2.3. The position of boat migrants in the discursive debate 
Discursive systems and practices can be used to exercise and maintain power, but can also be 
employed to counter existing power arrangements and to foster alternative ideologies. Indeed, 
power structures can be questioned, resisted and challenged through discourse.
165
 As such, 
can boat migrants utilize an alternative discourse as a tool of empowerment?  
In the context of OSB, boat migrants are generally unsuccessful in employing such an 
alternative discourse: indeed, for discourse to be effective, it needs to be heard. Boat migrants 
find themselves in an unequal power structure, with the authorities being able to elaborately 
express and foster concerns whilst boat migrants and their claims to protection are largely 
invisible
166
 and critical questions from journalists remain unanswered.  
OSB contributes to this process in two ways: by materialising in the dominant 
discourse on the one hand, and by utilising the practice of offshore processing on the other. 
Thus, first, boat migrants are both implicitly and explicitly continuously framed as a 
homogeneous group with similar backgrounds, motivations, and aims, thereby underexposing 
individual circumstances.
167
 The discourse leaves individual push factors and other 
determinants for embarking to Australia largely unmarked. Consequently, whilst the discourse 
presents a policy that is beneficial for Australians, ‘genuine’ asylum-seekers and boat 
migrants alike, the narratives and agency of the latter as individuals remain underexposed. 
This consequently translates into little media exposure: the Australian media indeed have little 
critical abilities and a high level of dependence upon Government spokespersons and 
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statements, thereby supporting the ‘propaganda model’.168 This closely relates to the concept 
of ‘cultural hegemony’ as developed by Antonio Gramsci.169 According to this concept, 
prevailing societal norms are socially constructed as such that they are perceived as part of a 
valid dominant ideology because of which the status quo is justified as natural and beneficial 
for all.
170
 Such dominant norms are thus presented and accepted as ‘common sense’ and as the 
only sensible way of regarding the world. Conversely, anyone presenting another world view 
is marginalised.
171
  
Secondly, all boat migrants are sent offshore within 48-hours after arrival – usually at 
Christmas Island – as a matter of policy, whilst the possibility to scrutinize RPCs in Nauru 
and PNG is minimal as access is severely restricted.
172
 Indeed, it remains uncertain what 
happens in offshore detention centres with a variety of observers and media delegations being 
refused from entering them, whilst vice versa, detained migrants face difficulties in reaching 
out to (legal) institutions in order to claim their rights.
173
 Offshore detention centres are thus 
simultaneously difficult to look into and to look out of. Discourse cannot effectively be 
utilized by offshored boat migrants because of this little visibility inwards and little 
accessibility outwards. With boat migrants’ narratives consequently lacking on the input side, 
their perspective are also lacking on the output side when the discourse is consumed by the 
public.
174
  
 
4.3. Socio-cultural contextual analysis 
Public and political debates in Australia have repeatedly used characterizations and phrases 
such as "invasions", "floodings"
175
 and "yellow perils" to denote irregular boat migration.
176
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In a similar vein, it has been borne out in literature that boat migrants have been framed as 
"jumping the immigration queue" and raising unemployment figures in such debates.
177
 In 
fact, over the past decades, the Australian Government has played into long-standing fears of 
"the Asian other" and portrayed asylum-seekers as "forumshoppers" and "terrorists".
178
 
The formulation of an appropriate response to concerns over immigration has been a 
continuous and prominent issue in the Australian political realm.
179
 This can be traced back to 
the late 1800s, when restrictions were implemented in relation to Chinese immigrants. In 
1901, the Immigration Restriction Act was passed, introducing further restrictions to prevent 
non-whites from coming to Australia. On the basis of this law, the White Australia Policy – 
favouring white immigrants – was advanced.180 Only in 1958, some of the restrictions as 
introduced in 1901 were abolished by means of the Revised Migration Act 1958. 
Subsequently, in 1972, the White Australia Policy was formally abolished. In the early 1990s, 
the locus of attention shifted towards restricting irregular boat arrivals. Thus, in 1992, a policy 
of mandatory detention was introduced for all arrivals without a valid visa, with further 
measures of offshore processing and the excision of territory for migration purposes being 
implemented in 2001 under OSB’s predecessor, the Pacific Solution. Under this framework, 
Nauru and PNG received significant financial aid from Australia in return for their 
cooperation, which – at least in the case of Nauru – became a significant source of income 
and prevented national bankruptcy.
181
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The Pacific Solution was a direct response to the MS Tampa incident in 2001, in 
which 433 asylum-seekers were rescued in the high waters by a Norwegian vessel. 
Subsequently, the vessel was denied permission to disembark at the nearest Australian port 
whilst processing agreements were rapidly – but successfully – negotiated with neighbouring 
countries.
182
 Offshore processing under the Pacific Solution was, however, indirectly 
triggered by various more fundamental causes. First, since preceding deterrence policies had 
proven to be ineffective, the Australian Government implemented the Pacific Solution to 
further discourage asylum-seekers and human traffickers.
183
 As Pickering outlines, deterrence 
was at the heart of the Australian Government’s response, with the Pacific Solution being "an 
act of escalated deterrence".
184
 As such, "[d]eterrence has come to be the raison d’être of 
Australian refugee policy".
185
 Second, electoral politics pushed for offshore asylum 
alternatives: indeed, former Prime Minister Howard tried to regain public confidence in the 
run-up to the 2001 elections by presenting strict responses to immigration, labelling 
immigrants as a "threat" for Australia.
186
 By implementing the Pacific Solution, Howard 
showed that his Government was exerting control and responded rapidly to migration 
influxes.
187
 Howard won the elections with a margin that had been very unlikely a few months 
before the introduction of the Pacific Solution.
188
 Third, to some extent, human rights 
pressures paradoxically contributed to offshore asylum measures being implemented: because 
of increasing pressure exercised by human rights advocates, the Government somewhat tried 
to dilute responsibilities and accountability.
189
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In the literature, the way in which the Pacific Solution operated has been outlined to 
amount to a development of crimmigration. Indeed, the policy framework simultaneously 
strengthened the Australian "place" and derogated other "placements".
190
 This was 
accompanied by more general measures aimed at border protection, with mandatory offshore 
detention being advanced in the name of national security.
191
 Offshore detention entailed a 
punitive regime of mandatory and unpleasant detention amounting to jail-like situations
192
 and 
was constituted by "draconian" policy measures.
193
 These measures were accompanied by a 
discourse of the federal Government, which was largely adopted by the media, in which boat 
migrants were deemed to be illegal, deviant, non-genuine, threatening and, ultimately, to be 
excluded.
194
 Such discourse was supplemented with nationalist rhetoric about the protection 
of Australia’s territory and culture, which was used to legitimize the policy.195 This discourse 
of illegality, deviance and exclusion is aptly illustrated by the ‘Children overboard affair’196 
and the controversial way in which the MS Tampa incident has been discursively linked to the 
terrorist events of 9/11.
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Phillips and Spinks have comprised the numbers of irregular maritime arrivals in 
Australia between 1976 and 2013 (Table 1), which remains the most updated list in relation to 
boat arrivals.
198
 The number dropped significantly when the Pacific Solution was introduced 
in 2001 and went up again when the policy was abolished. However, the reintroduction of the 
Pacific Solution in 2012 seems to have had little effect on arrival figures. In fact, in 2012, 
more maritime arrivals were registered than ever before. With this trend being continued in 
2013, the deterrence impact of the Pacific Solution remains questionable.
199
 As Neubauer puts 
it bluntly, "the boats have kept on coming".
200
  
 
Year Number of boats Number of people 
(excluding crew) 
1976 n/a 111 
1977 n/a 868 
1978 n/a 746  
1979 n/a 304 
1980 n/a 0 
1981 n/a 30 
1982-1988 n/a 0 
1989 1 26 
1990 2 198 
1991 6 214 
1992 6 216 
1993 3 81 
1994 18 953 
1995 7 237 
1996 19 660 
1997 11 339 
1998 17 200 
1999 86 3,721 
2000 51 2,939 
2001 43 5,516 
2002 1 1 
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2003 1 53 
2004 1 15 
2005 4 11 
2006 6 60 
2007 5 148 
2008 7 161 
2009 60 2,726 
2010 134 6,555 
2011 69 4,565 
2012 278 17,202 
2013 (to 30 June) 196 13,108 
         * Table 1: Boat arrivals in Australia since 1976
201
 
 
The examined discourse should be understood against this background. As outlined above, 
certain forms of migration have continuously been discussed both in public and political 
debate as phenomena to be feared and deterred. From the implementation of mandatory 
detention in 1992 onwards, irregular boat migration was particularly focused upon. The 
discourse examined in this article appears to fit well in this development: indeed, "stopping 
the boats" and preventing "illegal immigrants" from "jumping the queue" are discoursed to be 
key objectives of OSB. Moreover, when the Pacific Solution was introduced by Liberal Prime 
Minister Howard in 2001, the number of irregular maritime arrivals decreased tremendously. 
By contrast, after the reintroduction of the Pacific Solution under the Labor Government in 
2012, the number of maritime arrivals kept rising.
202
 Although it remains uncertain what the 
actual influence of the Pacific Solution on the number of boat arrivals has been, this 
background has been utilized by the Coalition parties in the 2013 elections to criticize Labor’s 
approach, to profile themselves as tough and effective on immigration, and to propose OSB as 
a more absolute militarized version of offshore processing in which the "no exception" 
approach is further centralized. 
In turn, the text is not only shaped by the context, but the context is also shaped (and 
reinforced) by the text: indeed, the examined discourse continues to play into – and adds to – 
existing societal fears and insecurities about migration. As such, through discourse, fear may 
have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more it is emphasized, the more it becomes real 
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and identifiable. In other words, language and context are not self-contained, nor do they 
remain uninfluenced by each other: on the contrary, they are aligned and can only be 
understood properly when regarded in light of each other and as mutually modelling.
203
 
Political rhetoric is driven by societal fears, yet societal fears are driven by political rhetoric.  
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
The present article set off with Welch’ dichotomy of ‘loud panicking’ and ‘quiet 
manoeuvring’.204 His framing of the Pacific Solution as a measure of crimmigration has been 
broadly supported, in particular in relation to its ‘loud panicking’ effect: indeed, the policy 
has been framed within broader discussions on border protection and securitization and has 
been accompanied by a scapegoating discourse that, through its differentiating capacity, 
frames certain groups of "crimmigrant others" as illegals, border threats, and potential 
criminals.
205
 Given that OSB constitutes a strict, militarized continuation of the Pacific 
Solution,
206
 the present article has attempted to analyse how Welch’ dichotomous framework 
of analysis can contribute to a proper understanding of the role and influence of political 
discourse in this regard. It has done so by adding specific themes of analysis that further 
denote the respective ‘walls’ of noise and governance.  
On the one hand, the analysis clearly supports the view that the Government uses 
‘walls of noise’ and tactics of ‘loud panicking’ to justify OSB. Through statements such as 
"our policies have always been about protecting Australia's sovereignty" and are aimed at 
both "border security" and restoring "faith in our immigration system", it is being assumed 
that (a) national sovereignty and borders are being threatened, (b) such threats originate from 
boat migration, and (c) OSB is effective in countering such threats. Indeed, the discourse 
repeatedly refers to the importance of protecting borders and sovereignty against criminal 
activities associated with boat migrants, with a strict deterrence approach ("stopping the 
boats") being warranted given the "scale of the problem" and the "border crisis". In this sense, 
the discourse creates ‘loud panic’ and draws the field of border securitization into the field of 
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administrative immigration control,
207
 congruent to previous developments as has become 
clear from the socio-cultural contextual analysis.  
Immigrants are distinguished on the basis of their mode of transportation, creating an 
undesired crimmigrant group of allegedly illegal, threatening and non-deserving boat migrants 
who buy a place from smugglers at the black market.
208
 Boat migrants are regarded as 
"seeking upward socioeconomic mobility", thereby underexposing their personal backgrounds 
and motivations as well as their protection claims.
209
 They are drawn into a crime discourse 
more explicitly as well: thus, they are linked to sexual assault and piracy on more than one 
occasion. Subsequently, boat migrants are "held to higher standards" with "low tolerance" 
levels.
210
 By this repeated discursive outlining of boat migrants as illegal and undeserving 
migrants who ought to be deterred and excluded, their crimmigrant imago is continuously 
fostered. In the absence of asylum-seekers’ narratives, these framings are "very difficult to 
refute".
211
 The label that Fleay and Briskman have used to denote detained immigrants in 
remote sites, "hidden men", is strikingly apt in this perspective.
212
 
At first glance, this ‘othering’ process may appear contradictory to the fact that boat 
migrants are simultaneously discoursed to be vulnerable persons and that the policy is aimed 
at saving lives at sea. Indeed, rhetoric of deterrence and exclusion is used in relation to boat 
migrants actively using their power and agency to reach Australia, whilst the language of 
vulnerability and protection is used when boat migrants are discussed as passive – and 
powerless – objects of human trafficking. However, the two narratives can co-exist because 
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they both foster the deterrence ideal: the active migrant who uses agency is framed as a threat 
and should as such be kept out, whilst the passive migrant who is a victim of smugglers 
should be protected from the dangerous trip at sea. Moreover, the framing of agency-using 
migrants as threats (or ‘crimmigrants’) discredits and marginalises their narratives, thereby 
leaving them largely unheard.
213
 Albeit with distinct rationales, both characterisations thus 
demand a decline in boat arrivals. Furthermore, they both homogenize boat migrants, thereby 
largely denying push factors and individual determinants and justifying that boat migrants are 
sent, without exception, offshore.
214
  
On the other hand, the discourse analysis provides an insight in how offshore 
processing can be regarded as a ‘wall of governance’ – or ‘quiet manoeuvring’. Apart from 
the legal question which countries have duties under international law to process asylum 
claims and to provide protection,
215
 the division and/or diffusion of responsibilities and 
accountability on a discursive plane does not become fully apparent. Indeed, responsibility is 
discussed through references to opaque policy constructions.
216
 Boat migrants are held in 
establishments which are discoursed to be Australian in a plethora of respects: indeed, 
Australia is discoursed to fund the construction and maintenance of the centres, to plan and 
manage operational matters and practical arrangements, to tender private contractors, to 
ensure health care, safety, dignity and respect for detained migrants, to have the power to 
independently bring detainees from the RPCs to Australia’s mainland for investigative 
purposes, and to be able to restrict media access to offshore detention centres. In other 
respects, however, the discourse states that the centres are run by – and that responsibilities 
are increasingly transferred to – the Nauruan and PNG authorities, and that the arrangements 
take place subject to Nauruan and PNG law. Responsibility thus seems to be discursively 
diffused through the language of "partnerships" and "joint committees". Even more so, issues 
of responsibility and accountability seem to be further diffused through the involvement of yet 
other actors, primarily private contractors.
217
 
In fact, apart from offshore processing, another tactic of ‘quiet manoeuvring’ can be 
discerned from the discourse analysis. Indeed, the discursive practice itself is used as an 
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instance of stonewalling, which has likewise been outlined as a self-standing ‘wall of 
governance’ by Welch.218 Thus, "[i]n Australia, there is no shortage of complaints that the 
government has stonewalled the media (and public) by its refusal to divulge complete 
information on border security and controversies over ‘boat people’".219 As has been analysed 
above, journalists’ questions have regularly remained unanswered and critical questions can 
easily be warded off by the Government and the military command of OSB. It is of 
importance to realize that this is facilitated by the particularities of the discursive practices. 
Since the policy brief and press conferences are the dominant discursive practices, they 
provide suitable platforms for the authorities to control which and how discourses are 
distributed and consumed. They therefore allow for a particular narrative to be expressed, 
leaving little room for both alternative narratives and critical approaches to be outlined. This 
stretches further than the stonewalling mechanism as identified by Welch:
220
 indeed, media – 
and as such, the public – are not only stonewalled through the withholding of information, but 
certain narratives also remain, through the choice of discursive practice, significantly 
underexposed. CDA thus has added value in that it shows how discourse itself has, being 
embodied through a certain discursive practice, become a form of quiet manoeuvring – not 
only in what it conveys, but also in what it does not convey and what remains at the margins – 
or is even left out in its entirety – of the debate. 
OSB can thus be characterized as a crimmigration policy making use of both ‘loud 
panicking’ and ‘quiet manoeuvring’. In fact, both processes seem to be closely related: loud 
panicking as conveyed through dominant discourse enables the Government to legitimize the 
use of quiet manoeuvring tactics, whilst such quiet manoeuvring tactics mute alternative 
narratives and thus leave the dominant discourse’s position unaffected. In sum, ‘quiet 
manoeuvring’ enables a powerful discursive practice through which ‘loud panicking’ can be 
distributed and consumed, both resonating with – and having a shaping influence on – the 
socio-cultural context. As such, the dichotomous analogy of walls as introduced by Welch can 
be identified and recognized in the various levels of analysis under the CDA approach.
221
 In 
addition, it must be acknowledged that both types of walls are much more interwoven than is 
sometimes suggested: indeed, dominant discursive practices are used as building bricks for 
‘walls of noise’ and ‘walls of governance' at the same time. Simultaneously, ‘walls of noise’ 
enable ‘walls of governance’ and vice versa. 
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In turn, this raises important questions related to the potential of contemporary 
protection mechanisms on both the national and international plane. Being surrounded by 
‘walls of noise’ and ‘walls of governance’, what possibilities do offshored migrants have to 
effectuate their rights under international refugee and human rights law? Which mechanisms 
do international legal instruments offer to ensure the accountability of the actors involved and 
how should the legitimacy and effectiveness of these instruments be regarded in light of the 
ongoing criminalization of immigrants? What lessons can in this respect be drawn from other 
nodal detention practices, for example in the criminal justice realm?
222
 Further 
multidisciplinary research is needed to answer these and related questions, looking at the 
extent to which legal mechanisms are effective in protecting those who are excluded through 
and behind ‘walls of noise’ and ‘walls of governance’. If crimmigration is a trend here to stay, 
we can indeed no longer suffice by pointing out its existence or by analysing how it is 
constructed. Rather, critical thought must be provided to the question whether, and to what 
extent, protection mechanisms are congruent with it so as to ensure that those framed as 
crimmigrant others – notwithstanding what is being thought about the process by which they 
are framed as such – are provided with access to justice, due process, and the rule of law.  
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